February 7, 2011
Net Working Capital Requirements
February 5, 2010
How much more is the Organic Aisle?
While researching the industry, the DSC professionals began to migrate to organic purchasing, and as we did, we asked the question, “how much more expensive is the organic lifestyle”?
A DSC experiment – the “Organic CPI”
Many feel that Americans do not buy organic because of the cost associated with organic products. But how much more expensive would it be to eat organic vs. non-organic, cheaper options? DSC is certainly not the first to ask this question, as it has been covered in New York Times articles, and one blogger has even tracked the price of organic vs. regular carrots over the past decade, but we felt that primary research would help us feel more comfortable with the findings.
In an effort to trim the scope of this investigation, I decided to focus on my personal shopping and what it would cost me to buy organic foods instead of my regular, non-organic purchases at my local, Manhattan, retailers – Fresh Direct, Food Emporium, and Whole Foods. To reduce the scope even further, I decided to focus on specific commodity-like food items that were available at all 3 locations and had both an organic and a non-organic offering. In total, I compared 8 food options highlighted in the table below. I originally set out to have a larger basket of foods to compare, akin to a CPI, but quickly realized that finding foods with both organic and non-organic offerings at all 3 locations was challenging. To be clear, this analysis was not meant to be overly scientific, but rather directional with hopes that some insights could be drawn. In all cases, I compared the cheapest organic option to the cheapest non-organic option.
| Item | Size |
| Eggs, large brown | 1 dozen |
| Non-fat milk | ½ gallon |
| Unsalted butter | 16 ounces |
| Orange juice | ½ gallon |
| Ground beef, 85% lean | 1 pound |
| Blueberries | ½ pint |
| Raspberries | ½ pint |
| Chicken stock | 32 ounces |
From my analysis, it is clear that organic foods carry a premium, and in this case, purchasing a basket of the above listed foods could cost between 40% and 45% more than their low cost, non-organic equivalent.
While the purpose of this analysis was not to find irrefutable truth, it gave us a sense for how much more expensive it would be to “go organic”. It also gave us more confidence in our assessment that despite the price premium associated with organic, the growth of the organic food space continues.
We are currently looking for opportunities to support organic businesses through investment. If you know a company in, or with exposure to, the organic food industry that meets our investment criteria, we would love to hear from you.
January 28, 2010
DSC's Evolving View of the Future of Publishing
While I think round one went to @aplusk (Ashton Kutcher – the most followed person on Twitter), all is not lost for publishers and other media gatekeepers. Individuals have the advantage of speed and agility, but gatekeepers have strength in their resources (financial and human capital). If corporations are to maintain their statuses as “curators”, they will have to use their resources to better understand their customers. They need to focus on in-depth consumer research and use their ability to track data, give away content, invest in web applications, etc. to better understand the communities of users for which the experiences they provide are relevant. We, as consumers, are struggling with information overload. Individuals spend hours trying to separate the “signal” from the “noise” and have turned to user recommendations for help, but these recommendations are as flawed as the recommenders themselves. Herein lays the opportunity for a book publisher or network executive to build credibility with a niche community. They have the resources to conduct research, create tailored content and experiences for their customers, and continue to refine that content/experience as the community develops. Some might argue that they can aid in the shaping of the future of that community. As media companies learn to be more relevant to the communities they serve, they will be able to monetize their experiences through products and services their communities are looking to consume.
Realizing that a few weeks of work does not make me an expert, I welcome your thoughts and feedback, so please add a comment, email me, or DM @andrewsaltoun. Also, we are actively looking to meet companies and people in the industry, so please reach-out with suggestions and introductions.
January 9, 2010
We Want to hear from You
There is a caveat to "absolutely". If an intermediary wants discuss a specific acquisition opportunity, we appreciate it when the banker ensures that the business fits some basic DSC investment criteria (1) $10 - $50mm of Revenue and (2) High margins / growth prospects.
December 7, 2009
Healthcare Investing Perspectives From Cedars-Sinai Trip
A few weeks ago Andrew and I went to
It was clear from the trip that our medical system is undergoing big changes. Healthcare is adopting technology, trying to work within a new regulatory landscape, and attempting to provide higher quality service. Guiding the direction of these changes is, of course, reimbursement. After all, regulators can use reimbursement to drive behaviors in the healthcare system. Having explored a number of healthcare investments, we were certainly no strangers to reimbursement risk. That being said, we believe the current environment will pose greater challenges to healthcare investors as new political initiatives and economic pressures further complicate the assessment of risk. The theme of political and economic uncertainty was raised in every dialogue we had with physicians and hospital administrators. Our expectation is that, as healthcare reform shifts from theoretical to actual, these risks will subside, but also the window for outsized returns will have shrunk. For now, we expect to be cautious when assessing opportunities that have reimbursement or regulatory exposure.
On the positive side, the trip reinforced our interest in medical business services. We have always liked services related to revenue cycle management and outsourced laboratory work. However, seeing, first-hand, the level of attention being devoted to EMR (electronic medical records) we have broadened our focus to include technology services (infrastructure and implementation) as it is our view that investing ahead of the technology improvements occurring in the system is likely to prove fruitful. Cedars is currently in the process of implementing a massive new technology program for the hospital and they are certainly not the only health system to do so.
Lastly, we found that doctors were focused on improving patient health by supporting preventative medical practices. Remote home monitoring and services to help patients complete their treatment courses were some of the topics that were top-of-mind for physicians. While some technologies have yet to be developed, we found that physicians were embracing ways to help their patients adopting technologies that would improve their health and the quality of healthcare they received.
All told, the Cedars trip was a great success. We reaffirmed some of our long-standing investment theses, gained clarity on the evolving health landscape, and acquired exciting new ideas that could offer great investment opportunities for us in the future.
November 30, 2009
Be true to your school (The Deal Magazine)
Interesting article on For-Profit Education landscape - Be true to your school (The Deal Magazine)
November 29, 2009
The Infamous Re-Trade
Examining this lost auction raised a number of questions about my responsibilities as an investor and the way we engage in competitive auctions. First and foremost, how ethical is a re-trade to a post-LOI deal? Are there grey areas or is it black and white? Second, what is a buyer’s responsibility to a seller during the buyer’s due diligence review of the business (pre and post LOI)? Is there such a thing as too much due diligence? And third, what factors in the traditional business auction allow unethical behavior to be rewarded?
The DSC Investment Process
As a small fund, one of our competitive advantages is the time and attention we are willing to devote to companies. This focus starts from the day we are introduced to a business. We believe that our speed and depth of research make us great collaborators for the businesses we work with. In this case, the sellers had expressed their desire to move quickly as they were concerned about changes to long-term capital gains rates in 2010. Within two weeks of being introduced to the company, we had traveled to meet management for close to 10 hours of diligence sessions and two dinners, 3 hours of phone conversations with the CFO, 5 detailed meetings with industry experts, 1 consulting engagement to analyze a specific driver of the business, and countless hours of other research.
As is common in our investment due diligence process, we identified the strengths and challenges facing the company. In addition, we listened to the sellers to understand their objectives; both financial and non-monetary. Using this information, we tailored a structure and valuation that best reflected the opportunities for the business and the desires of the selling parties.
So, why did we lose?
We did extensive research, listened to the sellers and management team to understand their objectives, and combined this intelligence to structure a highly tailored offer. Lastly, and most importantly, we developed a great relationship (personal and professional) with the management team. We were often told that DSC was management’s “favorite” group, which I will choose to believe was a genuine statement and not just auction politicking on the part of the intermediary or management team. However, after all of our work, our intel suggests that we were outbid by close to 25%. How, might you ask, could such a price discrepancy exist?
TMI (Too Much Information)
Through our diligence, we found that while the business appeared simple, it was actually extremely nuanced. During the course of our work, we uncovered risks that were buried well below the surface. In our recap calls with the intermediary and seller, post LOI, we were told that we did 3 times as much due diligence as any of the other parties in this limited auction. Thinking back to where we stood after having done a third of the work, I recall being comfortable with a valuation at least 25% higher than we offered in our LOI. I am obviously biased and unfortunately lack the benefit of complete information, but it did strike me as an odd coincidence that we were outbid by a price that, earlier in our investigation, we would have been comfortable submitting.
The Re-trade
Reflecting on the outcome, I am confident that the other buyer did not understand the business as well as DSC. They probably missed a number of key business challenges, that, with a few more diligence sessions, they will surely discover. At which point, they will most likely try to re-trade their price. And, because the seller is already in exclusive discussions with this buyer and negotiating with lenders, lawyers, and the like, the seller will be hard-pressed to walk away from their current suitor over a revised price that will probably look very much like the DSC LOI. There is a reason that pros call post-LOI sellers “pregnant” with a buyer. It’s really hard to walk away when you have already spent money negotiating documents and have gone to banks or other intermediaries as a team.
It is quite common for buyers to engage in this form of unethical behavior (i.e. impregnating multiple sellers with false hopes of a high price, only to re-trade later based on “new” information they have discovered during their due diligence). There could be many legitimate reasons why our competitor could have won without an ethical breach. For example, they could have been very straightforward with the sellers about their level of comfort with their proposal (i.e. “we have a lot more work to do and this is only a preliminary indication”). That being said, why does this ethical dilemma exist?
Why Does a Seller Choose Price over Certainty?
How important is the fact that you have done enough work to give a seller comfort that the deal you have put on the table will actually close? To answer this question, first one should understand the concept of “overconfidence” in behavioral finance. It holds that people tend to be “overconfident” in personal assessments as they are influenced by what they want to believe. For example, when asked if you are an above average driver, most people will say “yes” as they would not want to think of themselves as poor drivers, when in-fact, 50% of them will be less than average. Or, if you ask a public markets investment manager if he/she can beat his/her benchmark, the vast majority will say “yes”, when evidence would suggest that about 75% will not. In the case of sellers, often they are overconfident that a less informed, higher, bid is an accurate assessment of their company’s worth. Wanting to believe this reality, a seller will discount the fact that his bidder has done less work. Instead, a seller will put more weight on the investor’s “judgment”, disregarding the fact that he/she may not have spent the time necessary to gain in-depth knowledge of the seller’s business.
However, let’s examine our seller’s faith in investment “judgment”. One might argue that maybe the winning bidder, whom we have learned was another PE firm, knew something about the future that DSC didn’t, or that they had a rosier view of the business risks. Maybe they are simply smarter, and figured-out how to bid more based on the merits of the business in a third of the time. While these are certainly valid points of view, I would argue a counterpoint. I would argue that most people with access to more than $10 million of equity capital are bright individuals (this is probably “overconfidence” at work). And if these investors are reasonably smart, then they are valuing companies based on the discounted value of their future cash flows. Further, most private equity investors are promising to deliver their limited partners ~25% annualized returns (in other words, they are using 25% to discount a company’s future cash flows). So, if two intelligent private equity investors have a difference of opinion on the value of a business, it is most likely to be attributed to their view of the business’ potential for future earnings. In mega-buyouts, where most companies are multinational or at the very least, multi-product or multi-service companies, a 25% discrepancy would seem very plausible, but in the world of $2-$8mm EBITDA companies, where businesses tend to have one business line or niche, a 25% difference in valuation is large. So, unless the winning bidder in our auction was using a different discount rate (i.e. not 25%) or was able to better assess the future potential of this company, I would argue that they overpaid and will most likely try to re-trade the price somewhere down the road. Furthermore, if experience holds, the seller will probably accept the re-trade instead of opening-up the auction again to other bidders.
What is the Right Diligence/Bidding Strategy?
In summary, there is a possibility that DSC did not win this auction because of lack of investment judgment or lower discount rates. However, it is more likely that a bidder, with less information, was willing to make a bet on the future that, had they been better informed, they would not have been comfortable making. It is also likely, that the seller was willing to accept this valuation, knowing that it was less well informed, because the seller was overconfident in their attribution of probability to closing a deal with the less informed bidder. Lastly, and stay tuned to find-out, I would expect that his deal will close on terms that better resemble the DSC LOI than the proposal they received and accepted from our competitor (and, BTW, I expect that our competitor will close this transaction, because they were in-fact successful in getting our seller “pregnant”). So, in a sense, our buyer, who did less work, will be handsomely rewarded as the proud new owners of a company at a re-traded price.
So what is the Lesson?
In competitive auctions, how should a buyer approach a pre-LOI diligence process? Should you only focus on “deal breaker” issues and growth opportunities? Unless due diligence has helped you to rationalize a higher price, depth of knowledge can be a disadvantage. You may find yourself competing against an ethically “flexible” bidder who is willing to make an offer knowing they will re-trade later. So taking the ethical high ground will be rewarded with the difficult task of explaining the concepts of certainty and “overconfidence” to a seller.
What did DSC Learn?
By analyzing this situation, we better understood the mentality of those who might bid and re-trade later. Personally, I believe this practice is ethically reprehensible. In founding DSC, my goal was to create an organization that holds itself to the highest ethical and moral standards. As a result, DSC will continue to differentiate ourselves by working harder than our competition and better utilizing our vast resources to create the most concrete and well though-out proposals for business owners. In addition, we will make every effort to educate sellers on the risks inherent in choosing price over certainty.
September 27, 2009
Heathcare Spending Fact
Interesting Fact: McKinsey reports that the US spends more on Healthcare $1.9 trillion than it does on food $1.2 trillion...
Best of the Best... Teasers
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Business Description. Less is more. The best teasers are able to explain exactly what the business does to a reader having no prior experience with the business or its industry in 1-2 paragraphs.
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Financials. Apples to apples and more is better. I like to see 3-4 years of summary historical financial information adjusted for any acquisitions, divestitures, or other events that make year-over year comparisons difficult. Good teasers also include 3-5 years of projected performance. The best teasers include: Sales, Gross Profit, EBITDA, EBIT, Capex, Working Capital, and any other cash adjustments (+/-) to the income statement from the statement of cash flows.
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Industry Description. Again, less is more. The best teasers have a brief description which includes: market size (based on revenue), market share of the competitive landscape, segmentation of the market (high quality/high price, low quality/high volume, big business focus/small business focus, etc.), macro trends affecting market (impact of unemployment, etc.), historical and projected industry growth, etc.
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Offering. I look at this section to make sure I understand what a seller is trying to accomplish. If I cant answer the question, “why did [X,Y,Z] intermediary send me this teaser?” then the teaser has failed. The best teasers tell the reader that a seller is looking to retire, raise growth equity, take chips off the table, reduce their involvement, etc. And it’s always helpful to know "how much"; how much ownership is for sale (control, minority investments, etc.), how much time does the seller want to spend with the business post investment, how much capital is being raised, etc.? The best teasers clearly define the goals of the seller, both lifestyle and economic.
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Investment Highlights. This section goes by many names: Investment Merits, Rationale, Opportunity, etc., but the ultimate goal is to provide an investor with an investment thesis. This is the section that makes a great teaser. Investors are looking for a thesis behind which they can invest. Everyone is different, but I tend to look for competitive advantages, a growth story (often including macro trends in the industry) - a rising tide which lifts all boats, and a coherent “offering” section. If a seller says that they believe 100% in the business but want to sell 99% of their company and focus the majority of their time on another business, it’s a bit suspect. The very best teasers are thoughtful about the rationale for making an investment.
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Less is more. Be thoughtful and try to get the point across in as few words as possible. Remember, investors are looking at hundreds of these per year (its like resumes, make sure the text is thoughtful and concise)
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Cash Flow! Almost invariably, intermediaries do not show capex or working capital numbers for businesses they are selling. A company that makes $50 per year on the income statement and needs to spend $100 per year in Capex to achieve this income is not a very interesting business, but without a sense for historical and projected Capex, how would we know…
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Non-Disclosure Agreement. If you are running a process by which an investor will need to sign an NDA, include it in the email that you send with the teaser. BTW, always include a soft copy of the NDA. Most PE shops will have some standard language changes that are a lot more efficiently inputted using track changes in Microsoft Word.
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Eliminate the pictures and graphics. Unless the product or business is difficult to describe in words and a picture will help the reader better understand the “business description” section, leave photos out of the teaser. As well, graphs that show revenue growth or EBITDA margin are not useful unless they simplify very complex financial information. In an effort to keep the document short and readable, eliminating graphics will save a lot of space!
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Don’t forget to include your contact info. Full contact info for all members of the intermediary team is an obvious must, but you'd be surprised by how many teasers forget to give the authors credit.